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WHERE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
FREE SPEECH COLLIDE 
Mary-Rose Papandrea* 
 The idea for this symposium came about several summers ago 
when Joe Liu, Fred Yen, and I met for coffee to talk about the right of 
publicity, and more specifically, about a pending case involving the 
unlicensed use of baseball players’ names and statistics in a “fantasy 
baseball” league.1 All three of us teach the right of publicity in our 
classes—Joe and Fred in their intellectual property courses, and I in my 
media law class—but we approach the common law tort from very dif-
ferent perspectives. 
 I am a First Amendment scholar, and the right of publicity often 
seems in conflict with everything I know about the freedom of expres-
sion. Except for those cases involving fraudulent commercial endorse-
ment, the right of publicity seems largely unsupportable. After all, the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is full of cases that 
privilege the expressive interests of third parties over plaintiffs’ interests 
in reputation2 or privacy,3 and parody gets absolute protection as long 
as no reasonable person would regard it as presenting actual facts 
about the plaintiff.4 The U.S. Supreme Court has specifically addressed 
the intersection of the right of publicity and the First Amendment in 
                                                                                                                      
* Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. 
1 See generally C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
2 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that public officials’ 
reputational interests had to give way to the First Amendment even in cases involving the 
publication of false information, unless the publication was made with actual malice). 
3 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529–35 (2001) (concluding that the appli-
cation of the federal wiretapping statute to the disclosure of illegally intercepted conversa-
tion on issue of public concern violated First Amendment); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 
530–41 (1989) (rejecting privacy claim based on publication of rape victim’s name); Smith 
v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 837–46 (1979) (striking down statute barring the 
publication of the identities of juvenile offenders); Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 
435 U.S. 829, 837–46 (1978) (rejecting as unconstitutional a statute that penalized publica-
tions that reported on confidential judicial misconduct proceedings). 
4 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (holding that a public offi-
cial cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on parody adver-
tisement that was not reasonably believable); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967) 
(holding that false light invasion of privacy claims must satisfy “actual malice” standard). 
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only one case, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.;5 but there the 
Court took pains to limit its holding to the unique facts of the case, 
where the plaintiff’s “entire act” was broadcast, arguably damaging his 
livelihood by reducing the chance that people would pay money to 
come see his performance live.6 
 I sought out Joe and Fred’s guidance to help me figure out what I 
was missing in my understanding of the right of publicity. When we 
met, both Fred and Joe indicated that they too were skeptical about 
some of the right of publicity cases that have been decided through the 
years—like the famous Vanna White case7—but my impression was that 
the very existence of the right did not seem quite as odd to them. I sup-
pose that given their background in intellectual property law, it simply 
did not strike them as bizarre that the law would grant priority to some-
one’s alleged economic interests over the expressive interests of third 
parties. 
 In the fantasy baseball league case that brought us together, the 
league sought a declaratory judgment that its use of players’ names and 
statistics would not violate Major League Baseball’s right of publicity. 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri ruled in the 
league’s favor, holding that the players’ right of publicity was not impli-
cated because the use of the players’ names and playing records some-
how did not constitute use of their persona and identity.8 Although I 
agreed with the outcome, I found the court’s reasoning unsatisfying 
and, frankly, incoherent. Clearly the league was using the players’ identi-
ties, but under my view of the First Amendment, it makes no sense that a 
player could recover for the use of true facts that were readily available 
in the public domain. A year or so later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on First 
                                                                                                                      
5 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977). 
6 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective on Human Dignity, the First Amendment, and 
the Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1345, 1356 (2009) (noting that it is easy to read Zac-
chini’s holding as limited to its facts); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Money as a Thumb on 
the Constitutional Scale: Weighing Speech Against Publicity Rights, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1503, 1519–20 
(2009). I remain unconvinced that the right of publicity should trump First Amendment 
interests even in such limited circumstances, and in any event, as Diane Zimmerman notes in 
her Article, most right of publicity cases bear little resemblance to the facts of Zacchini. Id. 
7 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992) (revers-
ing summary judgment dismissal of Vanna White’s common law right of publicity and 
Lanham Act claims against Samsung, which used a robot with a blond wig on a Wheel of 
Fortune set in a number of advertisements). 
8 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. The court bizarrely suggested 
that only use of the players’ pictures would meet that standard. Id. at 1087. 
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Amendment grounds,9 but the decision was in tension with Missouri law 
the federal court was bound to apply.10 In addition, the decision did 
nothing to eliminate the great debate about how much of a role the 
First Amendment should play in limiting the right of publicity.11 
 Since that summer of the fantasy baseball case, Joe, Fred, and I—as 
well as David Olson, who joined the Boston College faculty in 2007—
have continued to have informal discussions about the interaction of 
the right of publicity and intellectual property law and the First 
Amendment. As these conversations continued, it was blatantly clear 
that we all had a lot more to learn about each other’s field (or at least I 
had a lot to learn from all of them). We thought it would be fascinating 
to have a conference that would encourage a more formal and more 
rigorous discussion of whether, and how, to weigh First Amendment 
interests in cases involving the right of publicity, privacy law, and intel-
lectual property law. We pitched our idea to the Boston College Law Re-
view editors, and we were pleased when they agreed that it would be a 
great topic for a symposium. 
 In April 2009, a remarkable group of scholars gathered at Boston 
College Law School for a symposium titled Publicity, Privacy, and Intellec-
tual Property Meet the First Amendment. The participants focused on First 
Amendment rights not only in right of publicity cases, but also in defa-
mation, privacy, trademark, and copyright cases. Rather than have a 
multitude of speakers on each topic—defamation and privacy law, 
trademark law, the right of publicity, and copyright law—we decided to 
invite just two speakers on each topic so that we could devote a substan-
tial amount of time to the presentation and discussion of each paper. 
The end result was a full day of fascinating dialogue that led to the series 
of thought-provoking Articles appearing in this special symposium issue. 
 This issue begins with two articles addressing current problems 
with speech on the Internet. Larissa Lidsky offers an overview of the 
evolution of libel lawsuits against anonymous “John Does,” where 
courts have struggled to balance the First Amendment right to anony-
mous speech against a plaintiff’s right to recover for damage to reputa-
tion. Lidsky notes that these lawsuits pose a dramatic chilling effect not 
                                                                                                                      
9 The appellate court concluded that the fantasy baseball league clearly did use the 
players’ identities for commercial gain, but the players’ right of publicity claims were out-
weighed by First Amendment considerations. See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc., 505 F.3d 
at 822–24 (8th Cir. 2007). 
10 See Zimmerman, supra note 6, at 1513. 
11 For a fuller discussion of the various theories courts and commentators have devel-
oped, see Kwall, supra note 6, at 1357–64. 
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merely on libelous speakers, but also on those expressing “uncomfort-
able truths and constitutionally protected opinions.”12 Lidsky reports 
that in the last few years, courts have generally come to recognize the 
importance of putting some procedural obstacles in place before allow-
ing the “unmasking” of anonymous speakers. Although the standard a 
plaintiff must meet varies from court to court, most courts require, at 
minimum, that a John Doe be given notice of the lawsuit and an oppor-
tunity to file a motion to quash in order to protect his anonymity. In 
addition, courts require plaintiffs to make some showing that their libel 
actions are viable. 
 Although these evolving standards offer greater protection for the 
First Amendment rights of “John Doe” defendants, Lidsky points out an 
even more heartening trend: the growing judicial understanding of the 
Internet as a communication medium and, as a result, more nuanced 
evaluations of plaintiffs’ defamation claims. As judges become more 
familiar with how people engage in expression on the Internet, they 
are more likely to take into account the context of the challenged ex-
pression when determining whether it is protected opinion, non-factual 
hyperbole, or actionable defamation. Lidsky expresses concern, how-
ever, that certain cases like Doe I v. Individuals, the so-called AutoAdmit 
case which involved “cybersmears,” tend to highlight the “dark side” of 
anonymous speech and will cause courts to retreat from granting 
strong protection to John Does.13 In addition, courts may grow frus-
trated with the limits of libel law, which do not offer the remedy 
wronged plaintiffs want most of all: the removal of the offensive mate-
rial from the Internet. In other words, Lidsky is concerned that courts 
are moving away from striking the balance in favor of the First 
Amendment and instead are granting greater protection to reputation. 
 Like Larissa Lidsky, Lauren Gelman is concerned about the Inter-
net and free speech interests. Gelman argues Web 2.0 technologies en-
courage people to share personal information with a social network of 
their friends and family while leaving it available for the entire world to 
see. She suggests that people are not natural exhibitionists; rather, they 
prefer to choose settings that make their information available to the 
world because they cannot define the boundaries of their social net-
works a priori. Gelman contends that social networking sites generally 
fail to provide adequate and appealing privacy protections, and as a 
                                                                                                                      
12 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John Doe?, 50 
B.C. L. Rev.1373, 1388 (2009). 
13 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008). 
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result, personal information is obtained by individuals outside of users’ 
“blurry edged” social networks. This is problematic because people are 
generally deemed to have no right of privacy in information they have 
willingly exposed to public view. Unlike copyright law, which provides 
robust protection to copyright owners whose works are used without 
their consent, “owners” of private information have limited recourse 
under the law when their information is disseminated without their 
consent. Gelman cleverly proposes a technological fix for this legal 
problem that would permit social network users to notify third parties 
how they want their content used, and when those directions are not 
followed, allow aggrieved users to ask publishers to take down that con-
tent. Realizing that her “take down” proposal would be unenforceable 
under the current understanding of privacy torts and First Amendment 
doctrine, Gelman nevertheless argues that it would be useful because it 
would lead to new social norms against unwanted disclosure of private 
information. 
 Given that it was the right of publicity that provided the original 
impetus for the symposium, we were thrilled to have two of the nation’s 
leading right of publicity scholars participate. In this issue, Diane Zim-
merman and Roberta Rosenthal Kwall present radically different views 
on the value of the right of publicity. Zimmerman’s Article focuses on 
the issue that has always concerned me in right of publicity cases: how 
to reconcile a robust right of publicity in non-advertising cases with the 
long line of Supreme Court cases giving much greater weight to First 
Amendment values than reputational harm, privacy interests, or emo-
tional distress. She notes that although the right of publicity originated 
out of concern for “dignitary interests,” plaintiffs have generally pre-
sented their right of publicity claims as ones where the defendants have 
unjustly obtained a financial benefit by trading on their personas.14 
Zimmerman concludes that “property rights can take priority over 
speech rights if and when it can be shown that without speech restric-
tions, total market failure will result.”15 In almost all right of publicity 
cases, she argues, there is no market failure. People will continue to 
create public personas even if the right of publicity is limited to those 
instances when the use of a celebrity’s identity is unjust. Zimmerman 
concludes that the right of publicity can survive the First Amendment 
only when the alleged harms are “significant, highly particularized, and 
                                                                                                                      
14 Zimmerman, supra note 6, at 1505–06. 
15 Id. at 1520. 
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non-speculative.”16 After all, she notes, the free speech rights of third 
parties are constitutional, while the vague economic and property 
rights that right of publicity claimants assert are not. 
 Unlike Zimmerman, Kwall does not limit her discussion of the 
right of publicity to the non-commercial context. Instead, she empha-
sizes the dignity interests at stake in many publicity actions involving the 
commercial appropriations of a celebrity’s identity that are not merely 
unauthorized but also objectionable, distasteful, and degrading. The 
dignitary harm is especially problematic when the use of a publicity 
plaintiff’s persona essentially amounts to compelled speech. By this 
Kwall means that the use of the plaintiff’s identity “forces” the plaintiff 
to say something that she does not believe, especially when the public 
would assume that the plaintiff has authorized the message. Kwall ar-
gues that it would make little sense to use the First Amendment to ne-
gate claims where this element is present given that one of the First 
Amendment’s purposes is to promote self-fulfillment and autonomy. 
Kwall’s contribution to this symposium is invaluable because it helps us 
think more deeply about what interest the right of publicity is designed 
to protect, a determination that is a necessary prerequisite to conduct-
ing any sort of First Amendment balancing. 
 In Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is it Time to Restrain the Plain-
tiffs?, Elizabeth Rowe asks whether trade secret litigation results in a 
chilling effect that so offends free-speech values as to justify placing spe-
cial restrictions such litigation. Just as Lyrissa Lidsky argues that cases 
like the AutoAdmit case threaten to derail robust protections for anony-
mous speech on the Internet, Rowe concedes that trade secret cases like 
those by the Church of Scientology, which has invoked trade secret pro-
tection in order to stifle public discussion concerning its religious prac-
tices, have led to calls for substantive reform of trade secret law and a 
greater emphasis on First Amendment interests. Despite these “bad” 
cases, however, Rowe concludes that any chilling effect trade secret liti-
gation might have on vigorous public debate is not unique to this area 
of the law but is instead the result of the broader problem of litigation 
abuse. Rowe argues that existing litigation safeguards can be used to 
minimize the risk to First Amendment interests. 
 In her article, Rebecca Tushnet also takes on the issue whether 
certain speech restrictions—in her case, the commercial speech doc-
trine—inappropriately skews public debate. Although trade secret doc-
trine inhibits the ability of outsiders to criticize a trade secret holder, 
                                                                                                                      
16 Id. at 1524. 
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the commercial speech doctrine restricts the ability of commercial enti-
ties to defend themselves in public debate. Tushnet considers the ar-
gument Nike made before the U.S. Supreme Court17 that a company 
should not be held, in essence, strictly liable for false factual statements 
it makes about itself. Otherwise, Nike claimed, its opponents would 
have an unfair advantage because they would be held to the lesser 
defamation standards of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 
 Tushnet insightfully points out that being on opposite sides of an 
argument does not, by itself, establish that the parties are equal, and 
that upon closer examination, the commercial speech doctrine does 
not in fact promote inequality. Tushnet notes that there are only three 
distinct groups that want to engage in speech about commercial enti-
ties or constrain the ability of those entities to make factual claims: con-
sumers, other competitors, and the government. She concludes that 
the commercial speech doctrine does not place commercial actors at 
an unfair advantage vis-à-vis other competitors because both parties are 
held to the same standard. With respect to consumers, the doctrine 
actually helps level the playing field because consumers and commer-
cial actors are not similarly situated. Commercial entities naturally have 
greater knowledge about their own activities, and they also generally 
have greater ability to access the media to respond to charges against 
them. Tushnet adds that abolishing the commercial speech doctrine 
would undermine false advertising and trademark laws. 
 Fred Yen and David Olson anchor the symposium with Articles on 
copyright law and the First Amendment. I must confess that this area of 
the law has always been a bit of mystery to me because it is fundamen-
tally based on a concept foreign to First Amendment jurisprudence: 
that in the aggregate, a speech-restrictive law (here, copyright law) 
serves to encourage more speech than it discourages. In his symposium 
contribution, David Olson points out quite persuasively that, even in 
the copyright context, this assumption no longer necessarily holds true. 
Expanding the copyright term to the life of the author plus seventy 
years does not provide any greater, more meaningful incentive to cre-
ate, and it dramatically limits the public domain of material that can be 
freely used. Although the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use 
defense limit copyright protection somewhat, Olson argues more must 
be done to accommodate First Amendment interests. 
 Like David, Fred Yen agrees that current copyright doctrine— par-
ticularly the law governing third-party copyright liability—fails to take 
                                                                                                                      
17 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 656 (2003). 
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First Amendment interests adequately into account. By definition, the 
various doctrines of third-party copyright liability involve situations 
where the benefits of speaking are separated from the burdens of liabil-
ity. As a result, intermediaries are more likely to chill otherwise pro-
tected speech in order to steer clear of the unlawful zone. Yen notes 
that in Sullivan, the Court concluded that erroneously restricting pro-
tected speech is worse than erroneously permitting libelous speech, 
and that this same sort of presumption should be adopted in copyright 
law. In order to be consistent with the First Amendment, Yen argues 
that third-party copyright laws should be applied less stringently so that 
more speech is tolerated, even if it means tolerating more copyright 
violations. 
 The Articles in this symposium issue are not the first to put the right 
of publicity, trade secret law, and copyright law under a First Amendment 
lens, but they provide an important contribution to this discussion. Per-
haps even more valuably, this symposium brought together scholars in 
diverse fields to engage in a critical dialogue on these important issues. I 
hope that this symposium will serve as an impetus for more conversations 
between First Amendment and intellectual property scholars. 
 In closing, I would like to extend a special thanks to all those who 
supported and contributed to this symposium. In particular, the sympo-
sium’s authors and commentators deserve special thanks for their in-
sightful, engaging, and thoughtful comments throughout the sympo-
sium. I would also like to thank the Boston College Law Review for hosting 
this symposium and for carefully and thoughtfully editing the articles 
that appear in this issue. Finally, I must thank Fred Yen, Joe Liu, and 
David Olson for not only providing the inspiration for this symposium 
but also for investing their seemingly endless time and energy in develop-
ing its contours and inviting speakers. I am so grateful to have them as 
my colleagues. 
